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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that The Supreme Court by rule 
shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Whether the district court erred when it imposed a three-year 
suspension upon the Respondent, Clayne I. Corey, but then stayed the suspension 
and placed the attorney in a probationary period, when the court found that the 
attorney had knowledge that a client's funds were not properly safeguarded and 
used for unauthorized purposes while under the attorney's control. The standard of 
review for sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in attorney discipline 
actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court may make an 
independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the evidence 
warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). This issue was 
preserved through closing argument and through the Sanctions Hearing Brief 
submitted to the district court. [R. 313 at 241, R. 191-194] 
II. Whether the district court gave undue weight to factors of 
aggravation and mitigation in Corey's misconduct. The standard of review for 
sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a 
correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court may make an independent 
judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. 
See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved through 
the Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the district court. [R. 195-200] 
III. Whether the district court erred in its application of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Utah Rules of Evidence. The standard of review for attorney 
discipline cases is a correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court may 
make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the 
evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). This issue did 
not arise until the district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law after the Sanctions Hearing. [R. 258-275] 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of 
Petitioner, submitted herewith: 
Rule 14-603 Sanction, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 14-604 Factors to be Considered in Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 14-605 Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Rule 14-607 Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Rule 26(a)(3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 702(a) Utah Rules of Evidence 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. The district court 
suspended the Respondent, Clayne I. Corey, under circumstances in which he 
should have been disbarred. The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct 
("OPC") appeals the district court's decision, and urges the Court to reverse it, and 
instead to enter an order of disbarment against Corey. 
The Course of Proceedings: The OPC filed a Complaint against Corey on 
June 2, 2009 [R. 1-11] On July 6 & 7, 2010, the district court presided over a trial to 
determine whether Corey violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). [R 
122-126] The court found that Corey violated the Rules, and directed the OPC to 
prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and an Order consistent with the 
court's findings. [R. 125] Corey objected to the OPC's proposed findings of fact and 
asked for the court to add certain additional facts. [R. 127-142]. A hearing was held 
on September 20, 2010 to reconcile the OPC's proposal with Corey's, and the court 
ordered certain changes to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which 
were then entered by the court on September 27, 2010. [R. 245-254] The court 
concluded that Corey violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, the 
matter proceeded to a sanctions hearing on September 24, 2010. [R. 204] 
Disposition in the Trial Court: Following the sanctions hearing, the court 
made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and entered an Order sanctioning 
Corey by suspending him from the practice of law for a period of three years. [R. 
258-277] The imposition of the suspension, however, was stayed based upon 
certain conditions imposed by the court. [R. 273-274] 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Proceedings before the OPC filed its Complaint in District 
Court: 
1. The OPC received an informal complaint from Corey's client, 
Maxine Stager ("Stager"), on June 2, 2004, which is the basis of this disciplinary 
action. [R. 111, OPC exhibit 16] 
2. The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court 
conducted a Screening Panel hearing on March 10, 2005, and directed the OPC 
to file a formal complaint against Corey in district court. [R. 2] 
3. The OPC initiated this attorney discipline action by filing a 
complaint against Corey in district court on June 2, 2009. [R. 1-11] 
B. Facts Established at the Adjudication Hearing: 
4. In June 1999, Stager retained the firm of Corey & Lund (Randall 
Lund) to represent her in a personal injury case. [R. 246] 
5. Stager signed a fee agreement on June 9, 1999 which provided for 
an attorney's fee of 33.3% of the settlement, unless the case progressed to trial. 
Stager's case settled before trial. [R. 246] 
6. On February 18, 2000, Stager accepted a settlement offer of 
$122,500.00. [R. 246-247] On February 25, 2000, Corey spoke to the insurance 
company regarding the settlement, and they issued the settlement check the 
same day. [R. 247, R. 111 OPC exhibits 47 & 51] The check was written to both 
Corey and Stager. [R. 111 at exhibit 17] Though the check purports to be 
endorsed by Stager, it is not her signature. [R. 310 at page 89, lines 10-12] 
Stager's fee agreement with Corey allowed Corey to receive, on her behalf, 
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money or anything of value to which she was entitled. [R. 248-249] 
7. On February 29, 2000, $124,803.60 was deposited into Corey's 
operating account, instead of his client trust account. That amount included 
Stagers settlement funds. [R. 247, R. 111 OPC exhibit 41 at 001217] 
8. Corey "knew" that the funds went into the operating account, and 
"knew" that checks were being written against the funds in the operating account. 
[R. 247] 
9. The account balance for the operating account went from 
$128,916.14 at the end of February 2000, to $2,909.12 at the end of June 2000. 
[R. 247, R. 111 OPC exhibit 41 at 001223] 
10. Though Corey practiced law with Lund, Corey was the only attorney 
with signatory control over the operating account. [R. 310 at 22-23, R. 313 at 
152-153] 
11. As of February 2000, Stager had not authorized Corey to use her 
settlement funds for any purposes other than to pay her directly. Later, she 
authorized Corey to pay her $500 per month through a special needs trust (which 
was never set up or executed), and to pay her medical liens. [R. 247-248] 
12. After the funds were depleted from Corey's operating account, 
Corey and Lund advised Stager regarding how to protect her settlement funds so 
they would not adversely affect her government Social Security benefits. [R. 249] 
In the summer of 2000 Stager met with Lund and Corey to discuss setting up a 
special needs trust to hold the funds. For several months, she had been 
receiving payments of $500 from Corey as part of a qualified plan designed to 
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preserve her receipt of SSI benefits. During the meeting, Corey advised her that 
the qualified plan and trust would prevent anyone from asserting that Stager had 
taken title to the settlement funds and was no longer qualified to receive SSI 
benefits. [R. 249] 
13. Though she did not know that her money was already gone, Stager 
consented, in the summer of 2000, to the placement of her funds into a trust that 
was to be prepared by Corey and Lund. [R. 249] In August 2000, Corey tape-
recorded a meeting with Stager and Lund regarding the trust. He recorded the 
meeting because he had concerns that Lund wasn't following through on the 
creation of the trust. [R. 250] Ultimately, Stager never signed any trust 
documents and no trust was ever funded with Stager's settlement funds. [R. 310 
at 37-38] 
14. Stager was asked to sign a Promissory Note, dated April 20, 2000, 
which listed Corey & Lund as the borrower and Stager as the lender, for a loan in 
the amount of $55,173.20 (plus 7% interest). Stager did not sign the promissory 
note. [R. 111, OPC exhibit 38] 
15. Stager ultimately received $10,500 via twenty-one $500 monthly 
payments from Corey. Those payments began in June 2000. [R. 251] The 
amount paid for Stager's medical liens by Corey was $20,368.44. [Id.] The 
amount owed to Corey for legal fees under the fee agreement was $40,995.90. 
[Id.] 
16. Stager eventually decided that she wanted to receive the full 
remainder of her settlement funds from Corey. She requested the funds, an 
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accounting of her funds, and her file. Corey failed to provide an accounting, the 
unearned funds, or the file. [R. 248] 
17. On the basis of these findings, the district court concluded that 
Corey violated the following Rules: 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), Rule 1.15 (b) 
(Safekeeping Property), Rule 1.15(c) (Safekeeping Property), Rule 1.16(d) 
(Declining or Terminating Representation), and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct). [R. 
252-254] Having determined that Corey violated the above Rules, the district 
court set the matter for a sanctions hearing to consider relevant evidence of 
aggravation and mitigation in order to determine the appropriate sanction. [R. 
254] 
C. Facts Established at the Sanctions Hearing 
18. Corey had a non-cancerous cyst in his brain. In 2009, when it was 
removed, the cyst was approximately one inch in circumference. [R. 258-259] 
19. Corey had been suffering from headaches for some time, and in 
2001 had a brain CT scan. [Corey Mitigation Trail Exhibits at 1700] At that time, 
the cyst was not visible, and the radiologist noted that there was no abnormal 
fluid collection, and the ventricles were normal in size and configuration. [Id.] 
20. Between 2001 and 2009, Corey was treated for migraine and 
tension headaches. He was also diagnosed with anxiety or bi-polar disorder and 
started on benzodiazepines. [Id. at 1614] 
21. The cyst was not discovered until 2009, when Corey's psychiatric 
physician, Dr. Jason Lee Anderson, referred Corey to other specialists because 
he began having slurred speech and blurred vision. Those symptoms were first 
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noted in Dr. Anderson's records on March 18, 2009. [Corey Mitigation Trial 
Exhibits at 1606] An MRI was ordered because of the slurred speech, and the 
cyst was discovered. [R. 259] Dr. Anderson had been treating Corey since 2008, 
when Corey had overdosed on Xanax. [Id.] 
22. In June 2009 Corey underwent surgery to remove the cyst. [Id.] 
23. As early as 1993, physicians had suspected that Corey was bi-
polar. Dr. Anderson, however, reached the conclusion that the symptoms of bi-
polar disorder Corey exhibited were likely caused by the cyst, which contributed 
to or caused Corey to experience mood swings, anxiety and frustration. [Id.] In 
his opinion, the cyst had likely contributed to the prescription of additional 
medication. [Id.] 
24. In Dr. Anderson's opinion, the combination of treatment-induced 
dependency on medication such as Xanax, and the cyst, contributed to Corey's 
misconduct with respect to Stager's settlement funds. [R. 260] 
25. Corey's law partner, Randall Lund, was charged with nine felony 
counts in April 2000 in Utah's Third District Court. [R. 261, R. 111 OPC exhibit 
40] Corey had provided testimony that he was aware of the pending charges in 
February 2000, but later changed that testimony and stated it wasn't until the 
charges were filed that he became aware of the alleged conduct. [R. 313 at 152] 
Corey took steps to ensure that Lund did not have control of the bank accounts 
after he learned of the criminal charges. [Id. 152-153] 
26. Corey had several instances of prior attorney discipline: 
a) In December 1992 Corey received an interim 
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suspension for violating several rules, including Rule 1.13(b), 
which, at the time, related to client trust accounts. He was ordered 
to pay restitution to twelve clients and was placed on supervised 
probation for one-year. [R. 261] 
b) In April 2002 Corey was admonished for matters 
relating to three clients. On admonishment was based upon 
Corey's violation of rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating 
Representation). The other two admonishments were for violations 
of Rule 1.5 (Fees). [R. 262] 
c) In May 2005 Corey was publicly reprimanded for 
violation of Rule 8.4(d) based upon his guilty plea to a DUI charge. 
[R. 262] 
d) in December 2005 Corey was admonished for rule 
violations in two cases. First he was admonished for violating Rules 
1.1 (Competence), 1.15(b) (Safekeeping property), and 8.1(b) (Bar 
Admission and Disciplinary Matters). Specifically, he was 
admonished for violating 1.15(b) when he failed to notify a client's 
former attorney of a settlement in a personal injury case, and for 
failing to protect the former attorney's lien. Second, he was 
admonished for violating Rule 1.5(b) (Fees) and Rule 1.15(b) 
(Safekeeping Property). Specifically, he violated Rule 1.15(b) by 
failing to render a full accounting of a tax refund he received on 
behalf of a client. 
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27. The district court concluded that the presumptive sanction for 
Corey's misconduct, under Rule 14-605 Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, was suspension from the practice of law. [R. 263] 
28. Based upon the evidence presented at the sanctions hearing, the 
district court found the following mitigating factors: 1) mental disability or 
impairment based upon Corey's cyst and treatment-induced medication 
dependence, 2) absence of selfish or dishonest motive (which the court gave 
"some weight"), and 3) remorse (which the court gave "little weight"). [R. 269-
271] 
29 The district court also found the following aggravating factors: 1) 
prior record of discipline, 2) a pattern of misconduct, 3) substantial experience in 
the practice of law, 4) lack of good faith effort to make restitution to Stager, and 
5) vulnerability of the victim due to Stager's seizure disorder (the court 
considered this aggravating factor "minimal"). [R. 267-269] 
30. Based solely on the mitigation, the district court stayed what it 
believed was the presumptive sanction of a three-year suspension in its entirety, 
and ordered that Corey be placed on probation subject to several conditions. The 
court ordered a probationary period lasting for as long as it takes for Corey to 
repay the money he took from Stager That amount is $50,371.21, plus interest. 
Corey is allowed to practice law during the probationary period. Should Corey fail 
to remain current in his restitution payments, the OPC may move to terminate the 
probationary period and seek to impose the three-year suspension. Corey was 
also ordered to complete twice the required amount of MCLE for ethics and 
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professional responsibility in his next reporting period, and take and pass the 
professional responsibility exam (MPRE) by the end of 2011. Corey was ordered 
to continue treatment with Dr. Anderson, with quarterly progress reports to the 
OPC. [R. 273-274] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court's decision to suspend Corey, rather than disbar him, is 
contrary to established law: Corey should have been disbarred for his 
misappropriation of a client's money. Based upon the evidence presented to the 
district court, the presumptive sanction for Corey's misconduct, according to the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and Utah case law, was disbarment. 
The district court erred in concluding that Corey's misconduct equated to a 
suspension, rather than disbarment. 
After mistakenly concluding that the presumptive sanction was 
suspension, the district court committed an additional error in its analysis of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors in the case. 
Finally, the district court erred when it arbitrarily and incorrectly applied the 
Utah Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure during the proceedings. 
The OPC asks this Court to review the matter, correct the district court's 
mistakes, and enter an order disbarring Corey from the practice of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court's Conclusion That a Three-Year Suspension Was 
the Appropriate Presumptive Sanction Was in Error Given Corey's 
Knowing Misappropriation of Client Funds 
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The correct presumptive sanction for Corey's actions under the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") is disbarment. The court erred in 
incorrectly determining that Corey's actions fit within the Standard's guidelines for 
a suspension from the practice of law. Further, despite evidence Corey 
presented to the district court, the court did not have a sufficient basis to 
conclude that Corey's misconduct was anything other than intentional 
misappropriation, warranting disbarment. 
A. Based Upon the Facts Established in the Adjudication Hearing, 
Corey's Misconduct Constitutes a Presumptive Disbarment Case 
Under the Standards 
The presumptive sanction in this case is disbarment. This is dictated by 
the Standards and by case law in this jurisdiction and most, if not all, other 
jurisdictions. The district court's decision to suspend, rather than disbar Corey is 
error and contrary to established law given Corey's misappropriation of client 
money absent truly compelling mitigation. 
The Standards set forth presumptive sanctions for broad categories of 
misconduct, absent the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
Pursuant to the Standards disbarment is the presumptive sanction if the attorney: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional conduct with 
the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of 
which includes intentional interference with the administration of 
justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, 
misappropriation, or theft; . . . 
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(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
See Rule 14-605, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Corey's misconduct falls within the 
language of Rule 14-605(a)(1) and 14-605(a)(3) and the presumptive sanction 
should have been disbarment. 
The district court struggled in its determination of Corey's mental state and 
eventually concluded, after the Sanctions Hearing, that it was "a case of mixed 
knowledge and negligence." R. 265. The OPC disagrees with that conclusion and 
asserts that the facts established at the adjudication hearing demonstrate that 
Corey knowingly engaged in misappropriation. In fact, the district court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered after the adjudication hearing support 
the OPC's position that Corey had a knowing mental state with respect to the 
misappropriation, and was not simply negligent. 
The district court found that on February 25, 2000 Corey spoke to Stager's 
insurance company and discussed the settlement she had accepted days earlier. 
[R. 274] This fact was supported by Corey's own billing records which 
documented the telephone call. [R. 111, OPC exhibit 51] Corey knew of, and 
anticipated the arrival of the settlement check from the insurance company. The 
district court found that Corey "knew early on that Stager's settlement funds went 
into his operating account" instead of his attorney trust account, and "knew that 
checks were being written against the funds in the operating account." R. 247. 
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The district court also found that Corey knew the balance in the account 
was dwindling. Id. Corey could have done something to stop the depletion of Ms. 
Stager's funds, but he did nothing. He also knew that he owed money to Ms. 
Stager, that the money was gone, and that she wanted her money in full. Id at 
248. Even so, Corey knowingly failed to return the money owed to Stager and 
failed to properly account for the funds. In addition, Corey knew that liens needed 
to be paid to the medical providers and yet he knowingly failed to make timely 
payments leaving Stager exposed. Id. 
Even though the district court made all the above findings regarding 
Corey's knowledge, the district court found that Corey didn't intend to deprive 
Stager of her funds, and thus, didn't meet the requirements of Rule 14-605(a). /of. 
at 265-266. The district court thus concluded that Corey's conduct was 
distinguishable from other intentional misappropriation cases where disbarment 
was the appropriate presumptive sanction. The district court found, "[r]ather, the 
presumptive sanction in this case, based upon Mr. Corey's knowledge of the 
situation but lack of intent regarding the result, is suspension from the practice of 
law." /of. at 267. The OPC disagrees with that conclusion. 
Corey's misconduct, according to this Court's decisions in similar cases, 
falls within the language of Rule 14-605(a)(1) and 14-605(a)(3). In In re Johnson, 
this Court found that disbarment was the appropriate presumptive sanction under 
both Rule 14-605(a)(1) and Rule 14-605(a)(c). In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 
2001) This Court found that Johnson knowingly violated the Rules, with the intent 
to benefit himself, and that his conduct caused serious or potentially serious 
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injury to the party, public or legal system. This Court made those findings based 
upon Johnson's violations of Rules 1.15(a), 1.15(b) and 1.15(c) for his failure to 
return funds to his client and his comingling of the funds, stating that "[t]he trial 
court's finding that Johnson knowingly violated rule 1.15 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for his own benefit was sufficient to support disbarment." In 
re Johnson, 48 P.3d at 886. The Rule violations found in the Johnson case are 
nearly identical to those in this case, and the conduct similar, if not more 
egregious in Mr. Corey's case, where there is no dispute as to what is owed to 
his client. 
In Johnson, in addition to finding that disbarment was appropriate under 
Rule 14-605(a)(1), this Court also found that disbarment was appropriate under 
Rule 14-605(a)(3) because the Court held that misappropriation is intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty that seriously reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law. Id. at 881, 885. In other words, this Court found that 
misappropriation was per se "intentional conduct involving dishonesty." In this 
matter, the district court concluded that because Corey lacked intent, the case 
was not appropriately subject to Rule 14-605(a)(1). That conclusion, however, 
fails to address the OPC's contention that disbarment is also the appropriate 
presumptive sanction under Rule 14-605(a)(3). 
Johnson and the present case are factually similar. Johnson settled a 
case for his client. While he initially put the money in trust, he then took the 
money out, and by the time the client asked for the money had converted it for 
his own use. Johnson did not return the money to his client and offered no 
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satisfactory explanation for why he kept the money. Corey's case is similar with, 
one exception. There is no dispute that Stager did not receive the bulk of her 
settlement, and there is no dispute that Corey owes Stager over $50,000. 
Johnson asserted as a defense that there was a question of fact about whether 
the client was entitled to the funds. Id. This Court found that even if it accepted 
the fact that there was a dispute as to amount owed to the client, Johnson had 
misappropriated the funds because he knew that he had not been gifted the 
entire amount. The Court found that Mr. Johnson had violated Rules 1.15(a), 
1.15(b) and 1.15(c) and Rule 8.4(a), exactly the same 1.15 violations as in this 
case. This Court found that these violations were knowingly made, and that these 
violations constituted misappropriation. 
Other cases in Utah and in other jurisdictions hold that disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for misappropriation of client funds. In In re Babil/s, an 
attorney was disbarred for charging substantial fees for little work, 
misappropriating the funds from his client's estate, and making 
misrepresentations to the client and the probate court. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 
(Utah 1997). In another Utah case, an attorney was disbarred for 
misappropriation with the Court stating that misappropriation of client funds, 
alone, is enough to trigger disbarment without the cumulative effect of other 
misconduct. In re Ennenga, 37 P.3d 1150 (Utah 2001). In Colorado, "when a 
lawyer knowingly converts client funds, disbarment is Virtually automatic/ at least 
in the absence of significant factors in mitigation." People v. Young, 864 P.2d 563 
(Colo. 1993). In another Colorado case an attorney was disbarred for two counts 
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of abandonment of clients and conversion of client funds. People v. Righter, 35 
P.3d 159 (Colo. 1999). 
This Court has consistently found that misappropriation of client funds is 
the most serious of all attorney misconduct, and is grounds for disbarment 
absent substantial compelling mitigating factors. Before a court considers the 
mitigating factors, however, it is appropriate to presume that the case warrants 
disbarment. The district court erred by determining that Corey's misappropriation 
equated to a three-year suspension, and the OPC asks this Court to correct that 
error. 
B. Even Taken in the Light Most Favorable to Corey, the Evidence 
Presented to the District Court was Insufficient to Justify a Departure 
From a Presumptive Disbarment 
1. The Evidence Regarding Randall Lund 
Corey presented evidence at the adjudication hearing, and at the 
sanctions hearing, in an effort to sway the district court from correctly determining 
that this was a presumptive disbarment case. Though that effort was effective, 
this Court has the authority to review the evidence anew, and correct the district 
court's error. As the Court stated in In re Babilis: u[i]n light of our constitutional 
mandate and the 'unique nature of disciplinary actions and our knowledge of the 
nature of the practice of law/ we accord less deference to the findings of the 
lower tribunal." In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 at 213, quoting In re Knowlton, 800 
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1990). 
In the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following 
the sanctions hearing, some time is spent discussing Corey's previous law 
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partner, Randall Lund. As is noted in the Findings, Corey and Lund met each 
other in law school, where they became friends. R. at 260. In 1994, when Corey 
was under attorney discipline and had to be supervised, Lund became his 
supervising attorney, and Corey's disciplinary suspension was lifted. R. at 260, 
261. In 1999 Corey and Lund began a law practice together, and took Stager's 
case in February 2000. Id. In January 2000 Corey began to notice "erratic 
behavior" in Lund, and in April 2000 became aware of Lund's criminal behavior1. 
Id. 
That finding, that Corey became aware of Lund's felony criminal behavior 
in April 2000, is contrary to the district court's finding following the adjudication 
hearing, where it was established that Corey knew of the conduct in February 
2000. R. 246. If the district court replied upon that finding to somehow remove 
some of the blame from Corey for the misuse of Stager's settlement funds, the 
district court erred. The district court wrote that even though Corey thought Lund 
was acting erratically in January 2000, he had no reason to distrust him at that 
time because he didn't learn of the criminal matters until April 2000. R. at 261. 
Again, this is contrary to the court's findings following the adjudication hearing, 
and contrary to Corey's own testimony.2 
Corey knew, in February 2000 that his law partner, Lund, was accused of 
engaging in criminal conduct. When the criminal case against Lund was filed in 
1
 Lund was charged with nine felony counts in Third District Court on April 26, 
2000. See R. 111, OPC exhibit 40. As Corey stated at the adjudication hearing, 
Lund faced the felony charges for "theft, for writing bad checks, for forging 
signatures..." R. 310 at 199. 
2
 Corey later testified that his original testimony, regarding his February 2000 
knowledge of Lund's legal problems, was wrong. R. 313 at 152. 
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April 2000 Corey entered his appearance on behalf of Lund, but then withdrew in 
July 2000. R. 111, OPC exhibit 40. Corey testified that he withdrew after 
speaking to a friend at the district attorney's office and reviewing the discovery. 
He then determined that his belief that Lund was innocent was misplaced. R. 313 
at 107-108. Though that didn't happen until after he had accepted Stager's 
settlement funds, Corey knew that Lund had been accused of criminal conduct 
before he accepted the funds, and, in fact, had taken actions before February 
2000 to ensure that Lund didn't have signatory control to the trust or operating 
account. R. 313 at 153. 
The district court's findings regarding Lund are inconsistent between the 
adjudication hearing and the sanctions hearing. The district court does not 
explicitly assign blame to Lund for the misappropriation of Stager's funds, but 
states that Corey had reason to suspect wrongdoing by Lund, and failed to keep 
Stager's funds safe. R. 265-266. In fact, there was not any evidence presented to 
the district court that Lund was responsible for the disappearance of Stager's 
funds. The district court then posits, after the Sanctions Hearing and contrary to 
the Findings from the Adjudication Hearing, that Corey's failure to safeguard the 
settlement funds wasn't a knowing act, and was more negligent because he 
failed to take steps to protect the money. The OPC disagrees with that analysis 
and asserts that all the evidence supports the proposition that Corey knowingly 
misappropriated Stager's funds, regardless of the smokescreen Corey created by 
suggesting, without supporting evidence, that Lund was responsible. 
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Further, if the district court believed that Corey's actions with respect to 
the misappropriation were truly negligent, and that Lund played a part, then why 
require Corey to pay full restitution, plus interest, to Stager? Though the OPC 
agrees that Corey owes, and should pay, full restitution to Stager, the district 
court's order that Corey pay the full restitution seems inconsistent with the court's 
determination that Corey's conduct was less than intentional misappropriation. If 
the district court believed that Lund played a part in the misuse of the settlement 
funds (which it never explicitly stated, but which can be inferred from the court's 
findings) then why is Corey solely responsible for their repayment? Lund was not 
a party to the disciplinary case, but the district court's order of full restitution 
could have been reduced by whatever portion the court believed Lund to be 
responsible. The fact is, there was no evidence linking Lund to the 
misappropriation of Stager's funds, and the district court ordered Corey to repay 
the full amount misappropriated in restitution. Lund was a diversion that Corey 
used in his attempt to argue that this case was not one of presumptive 
disbarment, and, unfortunately, he was successful in that endeavor before the 
district court. The OPC requests that this Court correct that mistake. 
2. The Trust and Stager's SSI Benefits 
The district court concluded that the evidence also showed that Corey 
took steps to protect Stager's funds by working to create a trust. The district court 
relied upon that finding when it articulated the reasons why it believed Corey 
lacked intent to deprive Stager of her funds, and why the court didn't believe this 
was a case of intentional misappropriation. The OPC disagrees with the district 
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court's interpretation of the evidence regarding the trust based substantially upon 
the timeline of events. Rather than presenting a picture of an attorney working to 
protect a client, the evidence regarding the trust shows a lawyer attempting to 
protect himself, after squandering a client's money. 
The district court wrote: 
...Mr. Corey's knowledge was not accompanied by the intent that 
Ms. Stager be deprived of her funds or that the settlement funds be 
used to personally benefit himself or someone other than Ms. 
Stager. Mr. Corey did not intend to cause harm or injury to Ms. 
Stager. In fact, evidence shows that Mr. Corey intended to protect 
Ms. Stager and her funds. Mr. Corey knew that Ms. Stager was 
disabled and received federal SSI benefits, and he believed that the 
payment of the settlement funds in a large, lump sum payment, 
would put her eligibility for future benefits at risk. The evidence 
shows that Mr. Corey, and possible even Mr. Lund, attempted to 
establish a trust to protect both the settlement funds and Ms. 
Stager's eligibility for federal benefits. However, Mr. Corey failed to 
do either, and failed to ensure that Mr. Lund did so. 
R. 266. The timeline of events, however, shows the error in concluding that 
Corey's failed attempt to establish a trust is a factor weighing in his favor. 
Corey knew on February 25, 2000 that the insurance company was 
sending him a check for Stager's settlement. R. 247. On February 29, 2000 the 
check for $124,803.60 was deposited into Corey's operating account, instead of 
his lawyer trust account. Id. Corey had sole signatory control of his accounts, and 
he knew the money was deposited into the operating account and not the trust 
account. Id. From February 2000 to June 2000, the operating account balance 
went from $128,916.14 to $2,909.12. Id. It was not until the summer of 2000, 
after the funds were depleted, that Corey, Lund and Stager met to discuss setting 
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up a trust to protect her settlement funds and preserve her SSI benefits. Id. at 
249. 
The meetings with Lund and Corey which took place in the summer and 
early fall of 2000 to discuss the trust were, at that point, useless, if not an 
intentional cover-up to conceal from Stager that her money was gone. The funds, 
which had improperly been placed into the operating account instead of the 
attorney trust account to begin with, were already gone.3 By the time Corey 
started talking to Stager about a trust, he had already been violating the Rules of 
Professional Conduct regarding trust accounts for several months, and he knew 
the funds were gone. Corey could not have transferred the funds into a trust at 
that point even if Stager had signed off on the trust plan. That Corey allegedly 
took steps to "protect" the funds, after they were gone, should not count in his 
favor. It should be looked at for what it was: An attempt to conceal the facts from 
his client. 
The district court erred in concluding that Corey's misconduct didn't rise to 
the level of a presumptive disbarment. The OPC urges this Court to correct that 
error, in light of its previous decisions setting out firm guidelines for the district 
court that attorney misappropriation cases will result in disbarment. 
II. The District Court Gave Undue Weight to Factors of Aggravation and 
Mitigation in Determining the Appropriate Ultimate Sanction for 
Corey's Misconduct 
3
 It is interesting that the district court took note of Corey's failed attempt to 
establish a trust to protect Stager's funds as a fact which went in his favor. Had 
Corey placed the funds into an attorney trust account and protected them to 
begin with, as he was supposed to do under Rule 1.15, none of the after-the-fact 
trust discussions and meetings would have been necessary. 
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The district court wrongly concluded that the presumptive sanction in this 
case was suspension. After making that conclusion, the court heard evidence 
regarding factors of mitigation and aggravation in order to reach the ultimate 
sanction. As detailed above, the OPC contends that the presumptive sanction 
was wrong, and moreover, after reaching that incorrect conclusion, the district 
court applied undue weight to factors of mitigation and aggravation and further 
reduced the three-year suspension to a stayed suspension and probationary 
period. Corey's conduct was intentional misappropriation, requiring disbarment 
absent truly compelling mitigation. There was no evidence presented at that 
Sanctions Hearing that this Court would consider truly compelling mitigation. 
This Court has articulated that in attorney discipline cases involving 
misappropriation, the sanction of disbarment is triggered even without the 
cumulative effect of other Rule violations.4 In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, P10. 
Once that sanction is triggered, in order to overcome the "presumption of 
disbarment, 'the aggravating and mitigating factors must be significant.' In fact, 
they must be truly compelling.'" Id., quoting In re Ince, 957 P.2d at 1237 and In 
re Babilis, 951 P.2d at 217, respectively. In this case Corey failed to present any 
evidence that could properly be classified as compelling mitigation for his actions. 
The district court, however, stayed the imposition of the three-year suspension it 
had ordered in light of what it believed was "compelling mitigation." R. 272-273. 
4
 Corey violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but, as this Court 
has opined in similar cases, the Rule violations involving misappropriation are 
sufficient to presume disbarment without considering other Rules the attorney 
may have violated. 
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The OPC disagrees that any of the mitigation offered rises to the level of 
competing negation as intended by th\s Court. 
A. Corey's Mitigation Was Not Truly Compelling. 
1. The Brain Cyst and Medication 
The district court placed significant emphasis on Corey's brain cyst when 
discussing the mitigation in the case. The district court found that the cyst, 
Corey's earlier diagnosis of bi-polar disease and his drug dependencies were all 
caused by the cyst and that his conduct in 2000 was also caused by the cyst, 
which was not discovered until 2009. R. 269-270. The basis for the court's 
conclusion in that regard was primarily the testimony of Dr. Jason Lee Andersen, 
Corey's psychiatrist. 
Dr. Anderson is the department chair at Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center and has been treating Corey since 2008, following Corey's Xanax 
overdose. R. 259. After hearing from Dr. Anderson, and reviewing other relevant 
medical evidence, the district court concluded that the cyst was "benign", but that 
it "affect[ed] Mr. Corey in a number of ways, such as contributing to headaches, 
stress, causing stress, and contributing to poor judgment, mood swings, 
impulsive behavior, memory problems, etc." Id. Further, the district court found 
that "Whese effects were influenced by the s'vze of the cyst and by what \t was 
displacing in the brain. Additionally, the cyst likely contributed to the prescription 
of additional medication." Id. The district court concluded that the cyst, combined 
with a treatment-induced dependency on Xanax and other medications, 
"contributed to Mr. Corey's behavior and deviation from the standard of care 
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expected of an attorney with respect to Ms. Stager's case and others that 
occurred around the same time." Id. The OPC disagrees with several of these 
findings. 
The timeline of Corey's cyst and the ultimate diagnosis of Dr. Anderson 
does not relate to the misconduct in Stager's case. Though the cyst may have 
been present, in some form, in Corey's brain since the time of birth, it was not 
discovered until an MRI was performed in 2009. R. 259. In fact, when Corey had 
a brain CT scan in 2001 for his headaches, the cyst was not visible and the 
radiologist stated that there were no abnormal fluid collections and that Corey's 
ventricles were normal. Corey Mitigation Trial Exhibits at 1700. This was, of 
course, after the misconduct in the Stager case. Further, Corey's cyst was 
discovered because he had developed new symptoms. The MRI was performed 
because of Corey's slurred speech and blurred vision, which developed well after 
the conduct in this case. Although Dr. Anderson testified that his opinions were 
based upon his review of all the medical records, he neglected to testify about 
the symptoms leading to his referral for an MRI. Though the cyst may have 
developed between 2001 and 2009, when it was discovered and removed, it's in 
error to conclude that it had any bearing upon Corey's misconduct in 2000. 
Corey did not begin taking Xanax, for stress, until "early 2000". R. 260. 
Before that time, Corey's doctors had prescribed other mediations for what they 
believed to be bi-polar symptoms and stress. It was not until the stress brought 
on by Lund's criminal conduct that Corey obtained a prescription for Xanax. Id. 
As the Court will recall, Corey accepted Stager's settlement check in February 
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2000, and placed it into his operating account. In the next few months, the 
operating account was drawn down to almost nothing, and Stager's funds were 
gone. Whatever effects the Xanax may have had on Corey (which the district 
court stated "could slow down executive function and negatively impact memory" 
!d.)9 those effects would have occurred after Corey placed the funds into his own 
operating account. 
Corey's anxiety and mental problems, which he treated with Xanax, began 
after February 2000, but Dr. Anderson failed to include that account in his 
opinion. In fact, Dr. Anderson's own records show that he repeatedly diagnosed 
Corey with bi-polar disorder and benzodiazepine dependence even after the cyst 
was removed and up until March 2010, when the diagnosis was first mentioned 
as secondary to the brain injury (the cyst). Corey Mitigation Trial Exhibits at 1599. 
Admittedly, Corey was experiencing stress, headaches and symptoms of 
bi-polar disorder before taking Stager's case. The OPC does not contest those 
findings. Rather, the OPC's position is that the district court erred by trying to tie 
the cyst, bi-polar disorder and Xanax dependence to Corey's dishonest behavior 
in the early part of 2000, and then call it compelling mitigation of his misconduct. 
If the cyst and medication abuse were truly compelling mitigation of misconduct, 
there would need to be some evidence that there was a causal connection 
between the mitigation and the misconduct, and the timeline for each yyould need 
to overlap. There is no such causal connection in this case. 
According to Dr. Anderson, the cyst "may have been contributory" to 
Corey's headaches, anxiety, mood disorder, and over-prescription of pain 
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medication. R. 313 at 65. Dr. Anderson also stated that the cyst could have 
impaired his judgment and made him "a little bit more impulsive."5 /of. at 68. When 
asked if the cyst could have caused Corey to take a client's money in 2000, Dr, 
Anderson stated that it was difficult to separate the cyst from the stressors and 
substance abuse to make such a determination. He thought that it could have 
impaired Corey's judgment, his memory, and made him more aggressive and 
impulsive. Id. However, when pressed to state if there was a causal relationship 
between the loss of Stager's funds and Corey's cyst and medication use, Dr. 
Anderson stated that he could not answer "yes or no" to the issue, without 
knowing more details, [d. at 72. The district court, however, overstated that 
opinion in its final determination of Corey's sanction. 
The district court, after summarizing the relevant testimony from Dr. 
Anderson, wrote that: "Pursuant to the expert testimony of Dr. Anderson, which 
the Court finds credible and which was unrebutted, the combination of the cyst 
and the medication causally contributed to Mr. Corey's misconduct." R. 270. Dr. 
Anderson made no such conclusion regarding causality and it was improper for 
the district court to find that this mitigation rose to the level of truly compelling 
5
 Dr. Anderson did not always place such importance on the cyst. In his treatment 
notes for Corey from April 2008 to October 2009, he essentially states that Corey 
exhibited a mood disorder and benzodiazepine dependence. After the removal of 
the cyst, he continues to note the Xanax dependence, headaches, visual 
impairment, and memory and mood problems. There is no mention in Dr. 
Anderson's notes of "impulsive" behavior or impaired judgment. See Dr. 
Anderson's Treatment Notes, Corey Mitigation Trail Exhibits, Exhibit 1, 1599-
1616. There is no mention of any symptom which would explain Corey's 
dishonest behavior. 
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mitigation. 
2. Other Mitigation 
The district court also found that Corey's lack of a dishonest or selfish 
motive was a mitigating factor. R. 271. The OPC had contended that it was just 
the opposite - that Corey exhibited a selfish and dishonest motive in taking 
Stager's money, which constituted an aggravating factor. This issue is discussed 
in greater detail in the next section, concerning the aggravating factors. 
The district court found that remorse was a mitigating factor which 
deserved "little weight or importance." Though the court didn't give this factor 
much weight, the OPC still believes that it was improper to consider Corey's 
"remorse" as having any mitigating effect. 
Stager decided that she wanted all of her settlement funds, and on April 
19, 2004 her new attorney wrote to Corey demanding a full accounting and return 
of the funds. R. 111 exhibit 12. It is now seven years later, and Stager still does 
not have her settlement funds. In fact, after she retained counsel to assist her, 
the $500 per month payments she had been receiving stopped. R. 263. Though 
Corey told the district court that he feels a moral obligation to repay her, he had 
failed to take any actions previous to the bar complaint and the district court case 
to express any genuine remorse. 
In the Ince case, this Court stated that Ince's "interim remorse and reform 
is not compelling." Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238. The Court noted that although Ince's 
law firm confronted him with evidence of misconduct, he "was not forthcoming." 
/of. at 1238. Additionally, Ince admitted the misconduct "only when confronted 
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with specific evidence and was never completely willing to admit to undiscovered 
misconduct." Id. The Court concluded that, "[r]ather than seeming truly sorry for 
his conduct and admitting to it, Ince seemed sorry only that he had been caught." 
Id. 
This Court also had occasion to consider remorse as a mitigating factor in 
the Tanner decision, which stated, Tanner's remorse at trial is irrelevant. 
Naturally, anyone going through a trial for [stealing client money and forging 
documents] would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead, the remorse 
question closely relates to acknowledgement of wrongful conduct: did Tanner 
feel remorse about his behavior before getting caught, and was he motivated by 
remorse in making amends? . . . The district court's ruling that Tanner failed to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct makes clear that Tanner was 
unmotivated by remorse until after discovery." Tanner, 960 P.2d 399, 403 (Utah 
1998) (citation omitted). 
As these cases make clear, remorse is shown through honest and 
uncompelled disclosure of the misconduct before it is discovered by others and 
an attempt to rectify its consequences without being forced to do so. Corey's 
expressions of remorse at trial simply do not qualify. Corey had many 
opportunities to tell Stager the true status of her money and repay her, and yet 
he chose not to. Offering to repay Stager now is not the act of a remorseful 
person; it is a gesture of someone with no viable alternative. 
This Court has explained that "[tjo justify a departure from the 
presumptive level of discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and 
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mitigating factors must be significant." In re Ince at 1237-1238; In re Ennenga, 
2001 UT 111, ffll 11, 12 (Utah 2001). Further, the mitigation must be considered 
in light of the particular misconduct. See In re Stubbs, 974 P.2d at 300 In other 
words, the mitigating circumstances must not be considered in isolation. See In 
re Tanner at 402. 
Serious misconduct is not easily mitigated. See e.g. In re Brewster, 587 
A.2d 1067 (Del. 1991) (mitigating factors including sincere, deep regret and 
attempt to rectify consequences did not overcome attorney's failure to maintain 
personal integrity by engaging in serious criminal conduct resulting in conviction 
for bank fraud). The Supreme Court of Iowa has noted that although its 
sympathy is frequently aroused by attorneys' personal problems, "protection of 
the public interest prevents us from being swayed by them." See Iowa Supreme 
Court Bd. of Prof. Ethics and Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Iowa 
1999). Further, 
Nearly every lawyer involved in these cases could cite personal 
problems as the cause of the professional downfall. But life in 
general is a series of problems and it is the fundamental purpose of 
our profession to face and solve them. Our profession certainly 
cannot excuse misconduct on the basis of personal problems. 
Id. (quoting Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Cook, 409 N.W.2d 
469, 470 (Iowa 1987)). 
Finally, as was stated above, this Court has said that disbarment is the 
appropriate presumptive sanction for misappropriation absent truly compelling 
mitigation. Corey's personal problems do not qualify as truly compelling mitigation 
and the district court erred in finding that they did. 
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B. The Aggravation Outweighs the Mitigation 
The district court found several aggravating factors under Rule 14-607(a) 
of the Standards, but failed to give proper weight to those factors. As this Court 
found in Ennenga, absent significant mitigating factors, significant aggravating 
factors in a disbarment case provide additional reasons to disbar an attorney. 
Ennenga, 37, P.3d at 1155, fn 6. 
First, the district court addressed Corey's substantial prior record of 
discipline. Not only did Corey have substantial prior discipline, much of the prior 
discipline directly relates to the Rules he violated in the Stager case. 
As was detailed in the Brief the OPC submitted to the district court before 
the sanctions hearing, Corey's prior discipline is as follows: 
I. Corey was placed on Interim Suspension on December 14, 
1992 for "causing great harm to his clients and the public, 
pending the final disposition of approximately fourteen (14) 
cases involving incompetence, acceptance of legal fees while 
refusing to provide meaningful legal services, conversion of 
client funds, aiding the unauthorized practice of law, 
misconduct, and filing a false application for admission to the 
Utah State Bar." 
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II. Corey was suspended on June 28, 1993 for violating Rules 1.3 
(Diligence), 1.4(a) (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), and 1.13(b) 
(Safekeeping Property)6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
III. Corey was admonished on April 10, 2002 for violation of Rule 
1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation) and Rule 
8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
IV. Corey was admonished on April 10, 2002 for violation of Rule 
1.5 (Fees) and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
V. Corey was admonished on April 10, 2002 for violation of Rule 
1.15 (Safekeeping Property) and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
VI. Corey was publically reprimanded on May 24, 2005 for violation 
of Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) by committing a criminal act that 
reflects adversely on the fitness of a lawyer to practice law and 
Rule 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
VII. Corey was admonished on December 21, 2005 for violation of 
Rules 1.5(b) (Fees), 1.15(b) (Safekeeping Property) and 8.1(b) 
(Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
VIII. Corey was admonished on December 21, 2005 for violation of 
Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.15(b) (Safekeeping Property) 
and Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) of the 
6
 Later re-numbered to Rule 1.15. 
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Rules of Professional Conduct. 
R. 196-197. The district court noted that the discipline in 2002 and 2005 resulted 
from conduct which occurred contemporaneously with the misconduct in Stager's 
case, but that Corey should have learned the importance of attorney trust 
accounts from his 1993 discipline.7 R. 268. 
In addition to the prior record of discipline, the OPC asserted to the district 
court that Corey's misconduct displayed a selfish or dishonest motive under Rule 
14-607(a)(2). The district court did not find that aggravating factor, and instead 
concluded that Corey had an absence of dishonest or selfish motive, which is a 
mitigating factor. The OPC believes that decision was a mistake. 
The district court wrote that "there is an absence of dishonest or selfish 
motive in this case, which is also a mitigating circumstance to which the court 
gives at least some weight." R. 271. The court also wrote that "there is no 
evidence regarding the fate of Ms. Stager's settlement funds. There is also no 
evidence that Mr. Corey intended to personally benefit or did personally benefit 
from the settlement funds." R. 266-267. The district court is correct in the sense 
that the OPC did not present evidence detailing what Corey purchased with 
Stager's settlement funds. That, however, is not necessary to the analysis of 
Corey's misconduct and his selfish motive. If it were, attorneys who 
7
 Though the court remarks that Corey should have learned from the 1993 
disciplinary suspension, the district court erred when it imposed the same 
sanction that Corey received in 1993. Under Rule 14-606(b), the Rule concerning 
prior discipline, the appropriate sanction for Corey would have been one level 
higher than the previous sanction for similar behavior. See, Rule 14-606(b), 
RLDD. 
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misappropriate money would essentially be rewarded if they successfully 
concealed the accounting details of their misappropriation. The evidence is clear 
that Corey deposited Stager's funds into his operating account, over which he 
had sole control, and four months later the account was nearly depleted. Stager 
didn't get the money. To this day, over 10 years later, Corey still owes Stager 
over $50,000.00. To say that Corey didn't display a selfish motive, but that he still 
owes her all the money he misappropriated, is irreconcilable. The OPC urges this 
Court to find that Corey's selfish motives constitute a significant aggravating 
factor. 
The district court correctly concluded that Corey's prior disciplinary cases 
established a pattern of misconduct under Rule 14-607(a)(3) and he had 
substantial experience in the practice of law under Rule 14-607(a)(9), both of 
which are aggravating factors. R. 268. 
The aggravating factor which seemed most important to the district court 
was Corey's lack of any good faith effort to make restitution to Stager. Id. As 
discussed above, the OPC does agree that this is an aggravating factor and that 
Corey should make full restitution to Stager. However, the basis for the OPC's 
position is our assertion that Corey knowingly misappropriated Stager's 
settlement funds. The district court didn't make that finding, but still considered 
his failure to make restitution a "significant aggravating circumstance." R. 269. 
Though the OPC disagrees with the district court's basis for this aggravating 
factor, we agree that it is a significant aggravating factor and, along with the other 
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factors of aggravation, heavily outweighs any of Copy 's mitigation v-.-j provides 
an additional reason to disbar Corey, See Ennenga, 5/ <-' ,->a d> i i ob n • 6 
I he District Court Erred by Arbitrarily and Incorrectly Applying the 
Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1 f ie district court erred wt lei i it incorrectly and arbitrarily applied the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP") and Rules of Evidence ("URE") with respect to 
tl ie testimony ~r n " Anderson. The district cot jrt treated Dr Anderson's 
testit i !oi ry as ; • . » ' • • - - , 
an expert under Ruie 26(a)(3) URCP - die 702(a) URE. Nevertheless, w-
ilistiKJ com I i.oiibidc' - <-' - • " •^ 
incorrect conclusory findings upon his testimony. The DPC asks this Court \, 
review and correct the district court's mistake. 
Rule 26(a)(3) URCP governs expert testimony. It states, in part, that "a 
party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used 
;il lri.il In ptnsnnf pv idenn: undiM Pulrs ft)?, , ' f i ' , i /'iFi vt \\h I l t i h Rul.'s i-( 
Evidence/' Corey made no such disclosure for Dr Anderson. Corey listed Dr. 
Anderson as a witness in i It lis I i ial \ iti less Desigi latioi i 1 c i tl ie Sail i- :::tioi is 
Hearing, and stated that Dr Anderson would testify regarding facts relating to his 
treatment of Corey and his opinions of mitigating circumstances. R. 154, None of 
tl ie requirements of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) were met foi Di . Anderson, but ti ie couit 
considered him to he an expert witness. 
11 i tl ie disti lie t coi ir t's f :ir idii igs of Fact ai id C DI icli isioi is of ! aw foil Dwii ig 
the Sanctions Hearing, the district court twice characterized Dr. Anderson as an 
expert witness, I he coi n I: wi ites: "h i tl ie expei I: c »ph iioi i c >1 " Di \i iclei sen i, tf ie 
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combination of treatment-induced dependency on medication like Xanax and the 
cyst contributed to Mr. Corey's behavior and deviation from the standard of care 
expected of an attorney with respect to Ms. Stager's case..." R. 260, and, 
"Pursuant to the expert opinion of Dr. Anderson, which the court finds credible 
and which was unrebutted, the combination of the cyst and medication causally 
contributed to Mr. Corey's misconduct." Id. at 270. 
The OPC has already addressed why those statements are incorrect from 
a substantive perspective based upon Dr. Anderson's actual testimony. See 
supra The Brain Cyst and Medication p24-28. in addition to being substantively 
incorrect, they are also procedurally improper under Rule 26 URCP and Rule 702 
URE. Had the court required Corey to fulfill the requirements of Rule 26 for Dr. 
Anderson's testimony, the OPC would have had an opportunity to review and 
challenge the Doctor's expert report under Rule 26(a)(3)(B). The OPC did not 
have that opportunity, Dr. Anderson was not designated as an expert witness, 
and the court improperly characterized his opinions as expert when they were 
not. The OPC urges this Court to correct those mistakes. 
CONCLUSION 
Corey violated the most serious Rules in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. This Court has a long history of treating the safekeeping of client funds 
as one of the most important duties a lawyer owes to a client Corey violated that 
duty, and should be disbarred for his misconduct. 
The OPC urges this Court to review and correct the errors made by the 
district court. Corey's misconduct falls within the guidelines for a presumptive 
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disban i lent case, yet tl le i , i c f » •< f ' r i!,,t f belie1 P< I it r it I\ wai rai ited a si ispension. 
After that incorrect finding, *he court I ontinued to en .ind improperly weighed the 
aggravation and mitigatior - -i-.-. - on. IIIMI.M . TI,IK< "ly slnyinq flic susp* nsru. 
ai id allowing Corey to continue the practice of (aw. 
This Court is the ultimate authority for attorney misconduct mailer, 1'h* 
C Mini, upon M-viPw of thn evidence, should find that Corey's misconduct requires 
his disbarment from the practice of law. 
D/VIFD: Mat cl i ^ ^ , 201 1. 
OFF :1CE OF f PROFESSIONS ! CONDI Y 
A d a m C. Bevis 
Assistant Counse l 
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ADDENDUM 
Table of Contents 
Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief 
Rule 14-603 Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 14-604 Factors to be Considered in Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 14-605 Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Rule 14-607 Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Rule 26(a)(3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 702(a) Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rules oil I enli.tl Impoikinu' "Lilm! in llic IHitiH! 
Rule 14-603. Sanctions, SLiiiiJaiibi lui Imposing I Amy*'! S,iinrli<»tts 
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or 
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct. 
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A 
lawyer who has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525. 
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law 
for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be 
imposed for a specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in 
no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more 
than three years. 
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be 
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-524. 
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended f nore than six months may 
be reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-525. 
(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a 
lawyer from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth 
in Rules 14-518 and 14-519. 
(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the 
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of 
the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice, 
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under 
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone 
or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of 
readmission or reinstatement 
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignatior\ with discipline pending is a 
form of public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of 
law while either an informal oi foi mat complair it is pending against 1h-
respondent Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth 
Rule 14-521. 
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies ,\;. .. h*? 
imposed include; 
(i)(1) restitution; 
(i)(2) assessment of costs; 
(i)(3) limitation upon practice; 
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver; 
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or 
professional responsibility examination; and 
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses. 
(j) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary 
sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another 
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. 
Rule 14-604. Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding 
of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
Rule 14-605. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 
set out in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate. 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to 
benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious 
or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; 
or 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or 
the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the 
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of 
another to commit any of these offenses; or 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(b) Si ispension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional ITlisconduct as defined iii Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes 
injury or potential injury to a parly, \hn public, or the legal system, or 
causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements 
listed in Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference 
with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law, 
(d) ,A i :li nonitic H i Admonitioi i is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined iri Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little 
or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system oi interference with a 
legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to 
potential injury or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in 
this rule that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 14-607. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to 
impose. 
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline 
to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a)(1) prior record of discipline; 
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct; 
(a)(4) multiple offenses; 
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; 
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct 
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim; 
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or 
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. 
Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems; 
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; 
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior 
to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward 
proceedings; 
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(b)(7) good character or reputation; 
(b)(8) physical disability; 
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental 
disability; and 
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to 
the misconduct; and 
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or i i lental 
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; and 
(b)(9)(D) tl IB recovei y arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of tt iat 
misconduct is unlikely; 
(b)(10) uiireasonable delay iti disciplinary proceedings, provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided 
further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice '•<-•>> :ltina from the 
delay; 
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving m--.\ » 
impairment; 
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(b)(13) remorse; and 
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses. 
(c) Other circumstances. I he foliowii ig cit ci jmstances should not be considered 
as either aggravating or mitigating: 
(c)(1) forced i >r compelled restitution; 
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against I IK-; lawy. . i , 
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and 
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain. 
Rule 26(a)(3). Gonoml lJ,« ivi'»i'"»s i ,imm infj Discovery Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony, 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person 
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, oi 
705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by tlle parties or ordered by the 
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or 
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose 
duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert 
testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the 
witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the 
expei t is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to 
which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation 
to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in 
which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within 
the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 
30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision 
(d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on 
the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph 
(3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
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